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1. Introduction
After nearly two decades of neglect in both discourse and action, the international 
community has again prioritised the agricultural sector. A full 25 years after its last report 
on agriculture (World Bank, 1982), the World Bank published the influential World 
Development Report on “Agriculture for development” in 2007. Although it has drawn 
criticism, the report is a significant contribution to the debate. Based on a thorough review of 
the literature and experience, coupled with well-articulated arguments, it attempts to cover 
all the dimensions of agricultural and related rural development (World Bank, 2007). 
A year after its publication, the food price crisis occurred, which reinforced the impact of 
this seminal work and underscored the importance of agriculture for developing countries. 
Since then, the international community, and the World Bank in particular, have 
reconsidered investment in agricultural development.1
The 2007 World Development Report emphasises that governments play a crucial role in 
supporting agriculture-for-development agendas. They provide infrastructure, services 
and social safety nets and, more broadly, address market failures, all of which require 
administrative capacity and financial resources. The challenges arise when governance 
issues disrupt such government support. Most agricultural economies are located in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In these economies, the highest share of aggregate growth originates 
in agriculture and the highest share of aggregate poverty (people living on less than 
$2,15 a day) is in the rural sector. Many of these countries encounter great difficulties in 
planning and implementing comprehensive policies for rural development. Those that are 
emerging from protracted conflict, crisis or war face even bigger challenges. The World Bank 
concludes (2007: 246): “As long as such fundamental conflicts – often threatening people’s 
lives – remain unresolved, using agriculture for development remains a distant goal”.
This paper addresses agricultural support in post-conflict or fragile states in sub-Saharan 
Africa, focusing on the implementation of agriculture-for-development agendas. It seeks 
to analyse the principles that drive donor interventions. It deals with neither the cause of 
conflicts nor peace-building processes, even though these are crucial to the effectiveness 
of external interventions. It does not assess motives for external intervention, even though 
these may shape the kind and degree of such intervention. The paper aims to identify some 
of the missing elements of current support to post-conflict and fragile countries, and articulates 
the role that agriculture could play in such situations. It identifies five main principles, 
in addition to the current practices, which could significantly improve the effectiveness 
of external interventions: understanding the context, promoting “jointness” of action, 
defining a holistic approach, planning long-term development, and including the private sector.
1  The 2007 World Development Report led to the drafting of the Agriculture Action Plan 2010-2012 of the World Bank  
Group (2009).
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The paper first examines the only two programmes in modern history that were successful 
in supporting agricultural recovery: the Marshall Plan and the rural reconstruction in Taiwan, 
both occurring soon after World War II. The next section compares the principles underlying 
these two success stories with more recent donor approaches, arguing that agricultural 
support cannot be dissociated from the overarching development strategy for the economy. 
An global approach is used on purpose. While it does not capture the crucial subtleties 
and local contingencies of donor interventions, it allows a discussion of the one-size-fits-
all approach, which, unfortunately, often prevails. The following section draws on the 
recent literature on donor support for agriculture in post-conflict countries, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa, to underline the differences between past and current interventions. 
From these differences, new priorities are identified for external intervention, particularly 
relating to agriculture. The last section concludes.
2. Lessons from success
Looking back, the only post-conflict interventions in agriculture that could be deemed 
completely successful are the Marshall Plan for Europe and Japan, and the Joint Commission 
on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) in Taiwan. These two examples contributed not only to 
the recovery of the agricultural sector but also to the rapid growth in the entire economy. 
Agriculture was a crucial factor in both growth stories. While these success stories may 
seem outdated, no such successes have been achieved since then. With hindsight, these 
two experiences could provide useful lessons that might have been forgotten too soon.
2.1 Agriculture in the Marshall Plan
Why was the reconstruction of Europe after World War II so successful? Despite a large 
body of literature on this issue, it is often forgotten that agriculture was at the heart of the 
reconstruction process. The first lesson of the European reconstruction lies in the priority 
given to agriculture, beyond food security, as a crucial factor in the recovery. The second 
lesson relates to the role of external actors, in this case the United States. In 1947, the 
United States launched the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan; 
this was a budgetary support programme for the reconstruction of European countries. 
The third lesson comes from the way the Marshall Plan was designed. The United States 
did not impose its will on the recipient countries: the initiative came from Europe, even if 
conditionalities were imposed. This allowed a partnership between the United States and 
the “free world” in designing the Plan, which ensured its legitimacy. European countries 
also made strong internal efforts to sustain the recovery process (Kunz, 1997; Chollet & 
Goldgeier, 2005). In so doing, they guaranteed the success of this form of overseas 
development assistance, which contributed to the subsequent establishment of various 
bilateral development agencies. The success of the European reconstruction underscores the 
importance of agriculture in the reconstruction process, despite the high level of economic 
development achieved before the war.
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2.1.1 Agricultural support, but not only
As the end of the war drew near, the importance of agriculture for the reconstruction 
of Europe was increasingly recognised. For instance, the German-American agricultural 
economist Karl Brandt (1945: 284) argued that, in “the simplest terms, reconstruction of 
European agriculture means employment for the farm population and food for urban people. 
But its successful performance implies all the difference between chaos and the return of 
individuals and nations to peaceful life”. Later, the first request from the Europeans to the 
Americans under the Marshall Plan was for food. Allen W Dulles, who helped to convince 
Congress to support European reconstruction, recalls: “What do we contribute? In first line, 
it will be food, fuel and fertilizer, to keep body and soul together, so that there will be men 
and women in Europe with the strength and the will to work. And then they will be given 
some of the tools so that they can increase their own production of food, fuel, and fertilizer” 
(Dulles, 1993: 73).
At the same time, the necessity of European governments driving the recovery process 
was strongly emphasised: “By placing the responsibility for reconstruction on provisional 
national governments in liberated as well as conquered countries, the problem of agricultural 
reconstruction will thereby be decentralised and reduced to manageable proportions… 
Policies of reconstruction for agriculture or industry drawn up wholly in terms of national 
autonomy and sovereignty could lay the foundations for an entrenched economic nationalism” 
(Brandt, 1945: 289-290).
The American government dedicated about half of its total aid to agriculture, which included 
the procurement of commodities, agricultural machinery and tractors. This amounted 
to $4,4 billion in the first two years of the programme. Furthermore, to supplement the 
administrative capacity of European countries, the American Economic Cooperation 
Administration was established to administer the Plan and assist governments in selecting 
productive investments within each country (Richter, 1950).
Supported by the Marshall Plan and other forms of aid that preceded the Plan, agricultural 
performance in Europe soon exceeded expectations. For instance, West Germany benefited 
from a special aid programme for occupied areas. As early as 1949, yields for its major crops 
exceeded their pre-war levels. They also exceeded the targeted yields for 1951-52, which had 
previously been described as unrealistically high.2 Between 1949 and 1952, West German 
farmers also benefited from direct government support: the aid coming from the Marshall 
Plan was systematically matched from the state budget. As a result, agricultural production 
continued to grow (Schmidt, 1955).
2  These goals were set in 1948 with the prospect of West Germany benefiting from the Marshall Plan (Raup, 1950).
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The Marshall Plan quickly became an undisputed success, and it was acknowledged that 
its support for agriculture had a ripple effect on the overall economic recovery. Evaluating 
the Economic Recovery Program, Richter (1950: 541-542) pointed out that “the program’s 
impact on industry, its aid to the restoration of financial stability, to the recovery of trade 
in general and to the improvement and stabilisation of social and political conditions have 
had an important bearing on developments in agriculture and in the markets for agricultural 
products. Conversely, the developments under the program for agriculture were important 
determinants in other areas of economic, social and political achievement. The increase 
in agricultural productivity and output improved the food situation and lessened the 
severe pressure on the foreign balance, thereby contributing much to the rise in industrial 
employment, productivity, and output; and hence to the improvement and stabilisation of 
general economic, social and political conditions.”
The Marshall Plan’s strategy to stimulate both agriculture and industry in Western Europe 
contributed to an increase (over pre-war levels) of 11% in agricultural production, 
40% in industrial output and 32% in aggregate gross national product (Kunz, 1997). 
These results were obviously not solely due to the aid provided by the United States 
(De Long & Eichengreen, 1991). However, while the aid was only seed money to facilitate 
recovery, it still amounted to $12,8 billion between 1948 and 1951.
2.1.2 Lessons from the post-war reconstruction of Europe
The recovery plan included both relief measures (i.e. food for emergency situations) and 
development interventions. The latter were mainly in the form of budgetary support to 
governments, which included ex ante targets and goals for each sector or activity to be 
supported. While agricultural development was a major objective, other economic sectors 
were also supported. 
The success of the recovery can be ascribed to several reasons, which can be classified 
into three categories. First, some prerequisites for success were in place:
•	 	Information on the state of the economy and on the living conditions and strategies of 
the people were available or easy to gather. This helped to identify the needs of rural 
populations and facilitated the right combination of food aid and agricultural support.
•	 	The structural transformation of the European economies had taken place before the 
war, setting them among the leading industrial nations of the world (Morgenthau, 1962). 
Consequently, the basic requirements for a rapid economic recovery were met in both 
agriculture and industry.
•	 	The post-war governments were strong enough to drive their economies. They had 
extensive administrative and bureaucratic capacity, sound legal systems and long 
experience of sovereignty and democracy.
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•	 	Despite the conditionalities of American assistance to free markets, European governments 
were far from adopting a laissez faire approach. They continued to own some utilities 
and heavy industries (De Long & Eichengreen, 1991); industrial policies protected vital 
domestic sectors from external competition; and these policies were easily implemented 
because productivity gaps between competing economies were fairly limited.
Second, European countries were able to rely on some intrinsic stabilising characteristics 
of the Marshall Plan:
•	 	The Plan was an unprecedented multi-year appropriation programme, which gave some 
predictability to the expected support (Kunz, 1997). At the same time, it was clear from 
the outset that the aid would eventually be withdrawn.
•	 	Instead of a country-based approach, the Marshall Plan had a regional vision, encompassing 
all the non-communist countries in Europe.
•	 	In 1949, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided the necessary 
security umbrella against any perceived threats to the region (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2005).
•	 	The foreign assistance came from only one source, the United States.
•	 	The recipient governments had to match each incoming dollar with a dollar from 
their own budgets, hence enforcing their accountability and commitment (De Long & 
Eichengreen, 1991).
Finally, because of these prerequisites and features of the Plan, European governments 
were able to act convincingly and effectively:
•	 	European countries undertook reforms to build a “mixed economy” with a strong 
pro-market orientation, which would support long-term growth (De Long & Eichengreen, 
1991). They provided public infrastructure, while private investment was boosted by 
the high returns to new investment (Eichengreen & Uzan, 1991);
•	 	Governments were willing and able to establish a social contract that provided a minimum 
level of well-being for their people through social safety nets. Most of the current welfare 
systems in Europe were set up immediately after the war (Rosanvallon, 1995).
The conditions under which reconstruction occurred were far removed from today’s 
post-conflict countries in Africa. While some the above principles might still be valid, most 
of them seem to have been lost. These include adopting a multi-year but finite aid plan, 
a regional approach to peace, an agricultural development strategy that is closely linked 
to the structural transformation process, and the creation of safety nets.
2.2 The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan
The second external support programme that managed to revive agriculture after World 
War II is the work of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 
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(JCRR) in Taiwan. The characteristics of the country at the time make this experience 
particularly interesting. Taiwan was a resource-poor, low-income developing country. 
It was overpopulated through both immigration and natural population growth (over 3%) 
but the domestic market was small. The economy suffered from high inflation and chronic 
deficits on the balance of payments (Liang & Hou Liang, 1988). Farm labour was cheap 
and plentiful (Yager, 1988). Hence, unlike in Europe after the war, conditions in Taiwan 
were similar to those of low-income African countries today. Yet, in less than two decades, 
Taiwan underwent a dramatic economic expansion, providing “an extreme version of the 
structural changes in a rapidly industrializing and resource-poor economy” (Wu Huang, 
1993: 61). What made this possible?
The JCRR was established in 1948 under the American Economic Cooperation Administration, 
the agency set up to administer the Marshall Plan. It aimed at containing the Communists 
in the north of the country: their success in gaining support in rural areas gave rural 
reconstruction a special urgency (Yager, 1988). The role of the JCRR was very different 
from that of the Marshall Plan. Harlan Cleveland (1949), the Director of the China Program 
of the Economic Cooperation Administration, notes that China was in the midst of a civil 
war when the China Aid Act of 1948 was passed. The aim of the Act was to prevent a 
worsening of the situation, the Americans being convinced that the Chinese government 
would otherwise be unable to prevent economic collapse. After Mao Zedong proclaimed 
the People’s Republic of China in October, the Chinese Nationalists retreated to Taiwan in 
December 1949. American aid stopped for a year before resuming shortly after the start 
of the Korean War (when China entered the Korean fray). The JCRR was then dedicated 
solely to Taiwan. In 1979, more than 20 years after its establishment, the JCRR ceased 
activities and was replaced by the Chinese Council for Agricultural Planning and Development 
(Yager, 1988).
2.2.1 Planning and financing
The JCRR was assigned the task of agricultural planning and development, and fulfilled 
this role impressively. The way the Commission was conceived and implemented played a 
critical role in determining both its effectiveness and the efficient use of funds in a particularly 
difficult context.
First, the JCRR operated under the principle of “jointness”, implying the joint definition 
of priorities, the joint management of the fund and its joint financing. This principle 
came from the initial experience of the JCRR in 1949: having two separate organisations for 
rural reconstruction, one American and one Chinese, was unwieldy and a joint commission 
was soon established to formulate and implement the programme (Conant, 1951). Originally, 
the JCRR comprised three Chinese representatives and two Americans who had spent 
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many years working and living in China; this was later changed to one American and two 
Chinese commissioners (Hough, 1969). In 1949, Raymond Moyer, who would later become 
a JCRR commissioner, justified the jointness principle as follows: “The reason simply is that 
success in any program in a foreign country, intimately related to any substantial portion 
of the life of that country, requires the combined knowledge and serious concern of 
representatives of both interested countries” (Yager 1988: 267). This principle is in stark 
contrast to donor practices of the past 40 years.3
Second, the allocation of funding was based on the assumption that any action had to 
reach the micro-environment to ensure that farmers were involved in the development 
process through institutional communication, dialogue and participation. This was called 
the “felt needs” approach.4 It provided a framework for selecting village and farmer 
participation projects that stood to produce reasonably large, immediate and tangible 
effects (Yager, 1988). 
For instance, the “felt needs” approach led to land reform between 1949 and 1953. This is 
often acknowledged as one of the principal drivers of rural development, as it boosts both 
agricultural productivity and farm income (see, for instance, Chinn, 1979; Wu Huang, 1993). 
Park and Johnston (1995) argue that, while land reform facilitated rural development, it was 
not the main driver, especially of productivity growth. Still, land reform contributed 
to higher incomes and a better income distribution as it reduced rents from over half 
of standardized yeids down to a third. The resulting increase in income stimulated rural 
demand for non-agricultural goods and services. This debate over the role of land reform 
illustrates the extent to which the JCRR developed a holistic approach to the multiple 
dimensions of rural development: given the range and complementarity of its policies, 
it is all but impossible to pinpoint any specific measure as the driver of its success.
To achieve the goal of participation, the farmers’ association network was used as the 
mechanism by which farmers’ needs and problems were reported upward, and public 
and private incentives, innovations and services were provided downward. It was only 
one component of a realistic rural development programme, and it contributed to better 
programming of the measures to stimulate the overall development of the economy. 
As Hough (1969: 184) notes, with the JCRR, “[a]n effective balance was achieved 
between the requirements of overall sector planning and controls on the one hand, 
and decentralised participation in and adjustment of sub-sector plans on the other.”
Third, the JCRR was protected from government bureaucracy by being on the outside. 
While both the United States and the Taiwanese governments had legal rights to oversee 
3  The most recent and innovative foreign assistance initiative is probably the Millennium Challenge Account rolled out by  
the Bush Administration and sustained by the Obama administration. Selectivity is a core principle of this aid mechanism.  
See, for instance, Giordano and Daviron (2006).
4  For further details on the land reform in Taiwan, see Tang and Chen (1955), Young-Chi (1962), Koo (1966) and Yager  
(1988: 99-124).
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and influence the JCRR, they agreed to preserve its autonomy (Yager, 1988). Hence, it served 
as the agency comparable to the department of agriculture in the Taiwanese government 
and later as the agricultural division of the United States Aid Mission (Yager, 1988; 
Wu Huang, 1993). JCRR commissioners attended any American or Taiwanese meeting 
where rural and agricultural development was discussed, hence ensuring good policy 
coordination. This gave the Commission significant freedom and flexibility in project selection 
and financial programming, allowing it to respond quickly to farmers’ needs and problems.
The JCRR was not an operating agency. Instead, it provided financial and technical assistance 
to governmental and private organisations to carry out projects, using simple procedures of 
fund allocation. More than half of the assistance was given to the prefectural and municipal 
governments and local entities (Kao, 1967). Particular attention was paid to the choice of 
the sponsoring institution for each project: the JCRR carefully selected implementers that 
could effectively use its financial and technical assistance, and always asked them to 
match the funds it provided (Yager, 1988). The impact on farmers’ income was often 
the main criterion for assessing proposed projects. The JCRR promoted the reform of 
landlord-led agricultural associations into farmers’ associations that provided services 
such as training, credit and commercialisation. The government, jointly with the JCRR and 
other agencies, provided strong financial incentives such as guarantees and subsidies 
(Park & Johnston, 1995).
Finally, the JCRR was only a small part of the China Aid Act of 1948. The Act allocated 
$275 million in economic aid and $125 million in “additional aid” for 12 months 
(Cleveland, 1949). It addressed food distribution as an emergency measure; the provision 
of commodities, mainly cotton, to avoid the collapse of the garment industry; and industrial 
reconstruction. Only $27,5 million was dedicated to rural reconstruction and allocated to 
the JCRR (Conant, 1951). The Commission also dealt with rural development, including 
basic services, infrastructure and support to other economic sectors and, above all, good 
local government in rural areas (Cleveland, 1949). The United States subsequently used the 
same configuration of aid to support Taiwan.
As summarised by Kao (1967: 622-623), “without the leadership, and financial and technical 
assistance of JCRR, most of the agricultural programs on Taiwan would be greatly impeded, 
if not fully stopped. Some observers attribute Taiwan’s rural prosperity to the JCRR’s efficient 
use of U.S. aid and credit the JCRR’s success partly to its joint, semiautonomous nature and 
its policy of utilizing local organizations as project sponsors.” Although there was some 
tension between the two governments about the autonomy of the binational commission, 
this autonomy was the guarantor of its future success (Yager, 1988). 
The figures below give some idea of the role and achievements of the JCRR:
•	 	From 1950 to 1979, its total funding amounted to $849 million (in 1979 dollars), a modest 
figure relative to the results achieved (Yager, 1988).
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•	 	Capital assistance ($213 million) constituted 59% of net domestic capital formation in 
agriculture (Kao, 1967).
•	 	From 1953 to 1964, the JCRR provided about 40% of the budget receipts of the Taiwan 
Provincial Department of Agriculture (Kao, 1967).
•	 	In 1956, the JCRR had a technical and administrative staff of 230 Chinese and 11 Americans, 
far fewer than any other department. In its first seven years in Taiwan, it carried out 
1 852 projects, resulting in a direct improvement in the lives of more than 90% of the 
people (Walker, 1959). By 1962, it had sponsored 5 114 projects for the improvement of 
agriculture both in Taiwan and on the offshore islands (Kao, 1967).
•	 	Agricultural output grew by 6% a year in the 1950s and 5% in the 1960s (Wu Huang, 
1993). Paddy production rose from 1 058 000 tonnes in 1948 to 1 839 000 tonnes in 1957. 
This was due in part to land reform but primarily to the improved productive environment 
and greater incentives generated by the overarching economic plan (Gittinger, 1961).
Like the Marshall Plan, American aid to Taiwan was not solely dedicated to agriculture; 
it also reached industry. What made the JCRR so efficient was the capacity of the Taiwanese 
government to create strong synergies between rural and industrial development. In this 
way, the JCRR participated not only in agricultural recovery but also in the rapid structural 
transformation of the economy: the linkages between agriculture and industry played 
an important role in the recovery and expansion process (Chinn, 1979). “The positive 
role played by the agricultural sector in Taiwan sharply contrasts with the experiences of 
many other less developed countries, where the lack of agricultural development acted as 
a drag on industrial and general economic development” (Liang & Hou Liang, 1988: S68).
This is not to say that a positive bias toward agriculture was developed – quite the reverse. 
Agricultural prices were controlled and food prices set relatively low to provide cheap food 
to the working classes but public subsidies were used to create incentives for productivity 
gains. Wu Huang (1993: 55) concludes: “Despite agricultural policy being unfavourable 
to farmers in the early stages of Taiwan’s economic development, significant increases in 
agricultural output and productivity were achieved because of public investments in research, 
extension, irrigation, and other rural infra-structure. Gains in agricultural productivity made 
possible the transfer of large amounts of capital and labour from agriculture to other sectors”.
2.2.2 Supporting agriculture within a broader development plan
The particularly difficult domestic context forced the government to promote agricultural 
development as the main sector of the economy while also pursuing additional objectives. 
“[T]he shortage of foreign exchange and the rapid increase in population, caused by the 
large population influx from the Chinese mainland and the high rate of natural increase 
in population (more than 3%), forced the government to adopt an agricultural policy 
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that served the multiple objectives of government revenue, self-sufficiency, foreign exchange, 
and price stabilization” (Wu Huang, 1993: 54). Therefore, the aid had to fit this particular 
context. 
While the JCRR was dedicated to rural development, American assistance was much 
broader. It played a critical role by closing Taiwan’s trade gap, which was due to high 
imports. These imports provided inputs to complement domestic labour and investment 
(Liang & Hou Liang, 1988) and military equipment to strengthen the national defence 
system against the People’s Republic of China (Walker, 1959). The closing of the trade gap 
brought macroeconomic stability, which was vital for coherent policy planning. From 1953 
to 1968, four four-year economic plans were developed, which articulated agricultural 
and manufacturing development in a balanced manner. The objective was a progressive 
process of structural transformation. From the outset, the JCRR was convinced that 
“[t]he development of industry was contingent upon a simultaneous development of 
agriculture” (Yager, 1988: 8). Hence, it ensured that, as the main sector of the economy, 
agriculture could provide labour, capital and raw materials to a growing industrial 
sector (Yager, 1988; Wu Huang, 1993).5 The development of the industrial sector created 
opportunities for the rural labour force: the expansion of non-farm activities substantially 
increased the income of rural households and reduced income inequality between farmers, 
thus increasing the demand for industrial products. This change in the income patterns of 
rural households reflects the shift from labour-intensive farming to the increasing use of 
inputs and capital stemming from the creation of non-farm opportunities (Chinn, 1979; 
Yager, 1988; Wu Huang, 1993). Chinn (1979: 300-301) concluded that a “strategy for raising 
rural incomes which focuses only on raising agricultural productivity, even if successful, 
may well prove inadequate”. Because of this overarching strategy, the share of agriculture 
in the net domestic product plummeted from 36% in 1952 to 19% in 1970 and only 6% 
in 1984-89 (Wu Huang, 1993). Meanwhile, manufacturing outputs increased from 2% in 
1952 to 24% in 1970 (Chinn, 1979) while the share of employment in agriculture dropped 
from 56% in 1952 to less than 19% in 1983 (Yager, 1988).
Hence, the classic economic transition pattern set out by Lewis (1954) and later Ranis 
and Fei (1961) held in the post-war recovery, as evidenced by the rapid structural changes 
during this period. The structural transformation was consistent with the evolution of the 
successive plans, despite the fact that food and export production had remained a constant 
objective over the 15 years. While the first plans emphasised the need to stabilise prices 
5  This paper does not discuss the specific policies of this period, since they may be specific to the situation.  
Nevertheless, the measures used to promote agricultural development went beyond support for agriculture  
in a narrow sense. They included support for research, access to research, better infrastructure, public health  
and family planning, land reform, smart fertiliser subsidies, guaranteed prices, export promotion schemes and  
the mobilisation of domestic savings. More importantly, the policies evolved over time in line with changes in  
the problems faced by the agricultural sector (Chinn, 1979; Yager, 1988).
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and produce substitutes for exports, these objectives were progressively replaced by the 
objectives of creating a self-supporting economy, supplying raw materials to industry, 
and creating job opportunities for unemployed rural labour (Yager, 1988).
2.2.3 Lessons from the JCRR
The JCRR played an important catalytic and coordinating role, developing a broad vision 
in the planning and implementation of policies and projects. “As a well-funded and 
flexible organization with semi-independent, supra-ministerial status, the JCRR was able 
to exert a strong influence on policy, seizing opportunities to support promising pilot 
projects implemented by governmental or nongovernmental organizations at any level” 
(Park & Johnston, 1995: 200).
Just as for the Marshall Plan, the determinants of the success of the JCRR can be classified 
into three broad categories. First, some prerequisites for the success of the program were 
already in place. The agricultural sector benefited from the colonial power’s economic 
strategy before the war. When the Japanese assumed control of Taiwan in 1895, 
they planned to turn it into a major provider of food. They developed the agricultural 
sector and constructed railroads, harbours and other transport infrastructure to facilitate 
exports to Japan. They also provided social services to improve the quality of rural labour, 
such as public health and primary education. The objective was to enable farmers to 
benefit fully from the measures to promote agriculture, mainly the development of financial 
services (i.e. banks and credit cooperatives), new techniques (via the creation of agricultural 
research institutes) and the provision of extension services (on-farm training) to implement 
such new techniques. As demonstrated by Ho (1968: 413 & 1975), “[t]he transformation of 
Taiwan’s agriculture was the major accomplishment of the Japanese Colonial Administration”. 
The JCRR built on this legacy: it ensured that all service and research institutions remained well 
funded and well staffed, and that the development of infrastructure continued (including 
irrigation, transport, electrification and communications).
Second, the assistance from the United States was devised to facilitate the development 
process:
•	 	It came from only one source, thus avoiding any problem of donor coordination.
•	 	It lasted for several years, through various mechanisms, and allowed Taiwan 
progressively to take over from the United States as the main funder. Taiwan received 
economic assistance until 1965 when its economy was deemed strong enough to stand 
on its own (Kao, 1967). However, the JCRR continued to benefit from money generated 
by (undisbursed) past aid through the establishment of the Sino-American Fund for 
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Economic and Social Development.6 Thus, although economic assistance lasted  
less than six years, the Fund provided resources for the JCRR to carry on its work.
•	 	After the People’s Republic of China entered the Korean War in October 1950, the 
United States provided military assistance to ensure the security of Taiwan, creating  
an enabling environment for investments.7
Third, the government had considerable capacity, which benefited the JCRR. This was 
reflected in the following:
•	 	Its ability to drive the economy: Many government officials and civil servants were 
experienced mainlanders, able to design and implement complex policies (Chinn, 1979). 
Liang and Hou Liang (1988: S73) note: “The promotion of exports came not through 
laissez-faire but through a complicated set of incentive measures. There are continuities 
in the fifties and the sixties in the nature of state guidance and involvement in the 
economy”.
•	 	Its willingness to act: Because government officials and civil servants were from the 
mainland, they were not tied to the local establishment of the island. Furthermore, 
after their defeat by the Communists and the exile to Taiwan, they were determined 
to prove the value of their political ideals. The speed with which land reform was 
designed and conducted illustrates this attitude (Wu Huang, 1993).
Finally, the principles that guided the work of the JCRR contributed greatly to its efficiency:
•	 	It was able to sequence its interventions by identifying priorities and objectives,  
and adjusting them over time.
•	 	Its structure allowed the JCRR to avoid much political interference and to preserve 
autonomy and flexibility.
•	 	Its autonomy to craft development plans and policies made them easier to promote  
and support.
•	 	The project screening process was particularly efficient. It was based on the greatest 
“felt needs” of the rural population in each region, with the objective of reaching the 
largest number of people. Technical and financial feasibility studies were thorough  
and sponsoring agencies were selected carefully.
6  Yager (1988) explains that this Fund was constituted of undisbursed aid, which was deposited in a special account under 
supervision of the United States, as well as upcoming proceeds from the sale of the agricultural surplus to Taiwan, and the 
repayment of loans contracted in local currencies. According to an agreement concluded in 1965, at least 15% of the funds  
were dedicated to the agricultural sector for loans or grants.
7  “A Military Assistance Advisory Group was set up in Taipei on May 1, 1951, and with its help the Nationalist armies were 
gradually re-equipped and reorganised into an effective fighting force. United States economic aid was reactivated in 1951, 
enabling more realistic planning for the island’s future… In December 1954 the United States and the Republic of China  
signed a Mutual Defence Treaty guaranteeing the military security of Taiwan and the Pescadores” (Walker, 1959: 127).
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The JCRR model has never been replicated, and it is hard to imagine how its specific 
organisational and political arrangements could be adapted to another context. However, 
the basic principles that governed the JCRR should not be forgotten, because the challenges 
Taiwan faced in 1949 are very similar to those faced by African countries today.8
3. Contemporary post-conflict interventions
What relevance do these critiques have for contemporary external interventions? 
The success of the post-World War II experiences was partly due to the institutional 
strength and capacity of the recipients, even despite the war. This allowed the United States, 
more as a stakeholder than a donor, to invest confidently in these countries. It could rely 
on their ability to develop and implement reforms, support their demands or “felt needs”, 
and be flexible in its allocation of assistance. It could also impose macroeconomic reforms 
to move towards a mixed economy that relied more on market forces. The private sector 
soon made use of this opportunity. In return, the United States benefited from the expansion 
of these economies and reaped the benefits of its tied aid.
Although compelling differences between 1945 and today’s Africa prevent these models 
from being transposed, some aspects remain relevant. In particular, the recovery of the 
post-war period was driven by the state. The main objective of intervention in post-conflict 
and fragile states today is to strengthen the state and enhance its capacity to deliver. 
Therefore, lessons can be learnt to support interventions in post-conflict situations. 
Various international initiatives have tried to improve donor interventions, owing in part 
to the increasing competition among donors in the “market for aid” (Klein & Harford, 
2005). The next section compares the initiatives related to post-conflict and fragile states 
to the two successful post-war interventions described above. It assesses whether the 
principles of these interventions are consistent with those of the post-war interventions, and 
whether some omitted principles could usefully be applied to current conditions.
Three global initiatives are considered according to their potential influence on donor 
practices in post-conflict situations: the conferences and resolutions on aid effectiveness, 
the Financing for Development conferences and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Principles for good international engagement in fragile states 
and situations. Figure 1 provides a timeline of these initiatives.
8  In 1969, Taiwan rolled out an agricultural aid programme to several African countries with the objective of gaining political 
support and preventing China’s access to the United Nations (Sim, 1971). Ironically, they did not try to adopt the JCRR model,  
so successful in their own country, for their aid to Africa.
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Figure 1: International initiatives on coordinating foreign assistance 
The paper focuses on the initiative of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD DAC), as it deals specifically with fragile states. Post-conflict situations are not the 
primary concern of the other two initiatives, but they are reviewed insofar as they affect 
such states. First, however, the next section defines post-conflict and fragile states.
3.1 Post-confl ict and fragile states: A deﬁ nition
There is a two-way link between conflict (whether interstate or civil war) and fragility in the 
developing world: many fragile states are prone to conflict, and most countries emerging 
from conflict are fragile. Consequently, when post-conflict interventions are undertaken, 
countries are seen as fragile. This makes fragility the focus of the analysis.
There is still no generally accepted definition of a fragile state: a myriad of causes, sometimes 
seemingly contradictory, can reduce a country to the vague category of “fragile state”. 
The definitional difficulty has led to some ambiguity. Nevertheless, the definition provided 
by the OECD’s Principles (OECD/DAC, 2007) is a good “second best”: even though these 
Principles are non-binding, they come from a consultative process with all the members of 
the OECD DAC.
 According to the OECD, “[s]tates are fragile when state structures lack political will 
and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development 
and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” (OECD/DAC, 2007: 2). 
This definition underscores the political nature of state fragility. Several donors have 
acknowledged this dimension, like the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
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Development (DFID, 2009). Others, like the World Bank, have not: “fragile states is the 
term used for countries facing particularly severe development challenges such as weak 
institutional capacity, weak governance, political instability, and frequently on-going 
violence or the legacy effects of past severe conflict”.9 It is consistent with the mandate 
of the Bank not to intervene in domestic politics but it could be argued that this should 
not prevent the Bank from undertaking a sound political economy analysis of the sources 
of fragility (Rocha Menocal et al., 2008).
In practice, donors have looked at fragility in terms of their own interests and the difficulties 
they face when engaging with fragile countries. In this respect, the approach developed 
by the International Development Association (IDA), the arm of the World Bank Group 
that provides grants and soft loans to the poorest countries, is particularly instructive. 
As is often acknowledged, IDA procedures have a significant influence on the procedures 
of other donors (Kanbur, 2004). The origins of these procedures lie in the broader debate 
around the effectiveness of foreign assistance by the World Bank in the 1990s, when it sought 
to demonstrate that good governance is a necessary condition for aid to be effective.10 
While there is no clear evidence of this relationship between aid effectiveness and good 
governance, selectivity has become an important word in the development community. 
Various criteria have been used to identify countries where foreign aid would be the 
most effective (Daviron & Giordano, 2007).
The IDA identifies different sources of fragility, using 16 criteria in four clusters to 
conduct a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA),11 as shown in Table 1. 
This assessment, combined with the annual report on portfolio performance, constitutes 
the Country Performance Rating (CPR), which is then used to determine the country’s 
allocation. Countries with a CPR index below 3,2 are classified as fragile. However, the 
World Bank notes: “Countries with a CPIA score below 3.2 may not exhibit fragility, 
and there may be some aspects of fragility in countries with CPIA scores above 3.2.”12
This methodology has been criticised and somewhat improved over time. Yet, many 
weaknesses remain. The main criticisms are briefly outlined below.
First, the underlying assumption of this approach is that the prerequisites for economic 
development are well known. Each fragile country is assumed to suffer from a range of 
weaknesses (summarised in the 16 criteria), with different intensities. It is further assumed 
9  go.worldbank.org/P5E2CSXGY0
10  See, for instance, the conclusions of Collier and Dollar (2002) and Burnside and Dollar (2000),  
questioned by Easterly et al. (2003), on aid effectiveness as a major issue for the donor community.
11  go.worldbank.org/7NMQ1P0W10 provides information on the CPIA.
12  go.worldbank.org/38IERKDDM1
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that these weaknesses have to be overcome to improve aid effectiveness and development. 
However, these prerequisites cannot be absolute, since several countries, notably the “Asian 
tigers”, boosted their economies without complying with them (Kanbur, 2004).
Table 1: The 16 criteria of the CPIA 
A.  Economic 
management
B.  Structural 
policies
C.  Policies for social 
inclusion and equity
D.  Public sector 
management and 
institutions
1.   Macroeconomic 
management
4.  Trade 7.  Gender equality 12.  Property rights and  
rule-based governance
2.  Fiscal policy 5.   Financial 
sector
8.   Equity of public 
resource use
13.  Quality of budgetary and 
financial management
3.  Debt policy 6.   Business 
regulatory 
environment
9.    Building human 
resources
14.  Efficiency of revenue 
mobilisation
10.  Social protection 
and labour
15.  Quality of public 
administration
11.  Policies and 
institutions for 
environmental 
sustainability
16.  Transparency, 
accountability and 
corruption in the  
public sector
Source: World Bank.
Second, it assumes the pursuit of “ideal” prerequisites, based on the donor’s own “universal” 
view of development – the criteria are the same for every country (Kanbur, 2004). This is 
particularly problematic for institutional reforms, which account for 68% of the CPR, as 
shown in the formula below:13
These institutional requirements are primarily based on Western institutional models, 
despite the fact that most African states have never resembled the modern Western 
state in either their institutional characteristics or their functioning. On the contrary, 
African states have developed along a diverse spectrum following local contingencies and 
historical trajectories (Bayart, 2006; Pouligny, 2009). In this context, seeking to apply 
Western institutional prerequisites to fragile countries is dangerous (Engelbert & Tull, 2008): 
there is much to learn about the dynamics of state formation in these countries, and such 
knowledge must be incorporated into the scheme of donor interventions in Africa.
13  The subscript letters A–C and D refer to the four clusters of the CPIA mentioned in Table 1.
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Third, the CPIA supposes a simple link between policy and institutional reforms and aid 
effectiveness, while the literature on aid effectiveness does not provide a clear answer 
on this issue (McGillivray, 2004). Therefore, allocating aid according to the CPIA criteria 
is an oversimplification of the world in which donors operate. Furthermore, with a CPIA 
index below 3,2, a country is classified as fragile without any justification for choosing 
this threshold. This implies that some countries close to the margins of the definition 
could be incorrectly classified and would therefore not benefit from the same capacity 
for IDA intervention (Baliamoune-Lutz & McGillivray, 2008).
Fourth, using past records to determine future evolution is, generally speaking, a flawed 
method because of the possibility of unforeseen events (Taleb, 2007). This is also true for 
the CPIA, especially when applied to fragile countries: states are classified as fragile because 
of their poor social, economic, political and institutional records. Allocating low levels of 
aid while expecting countries to fix the problem themselves seems highly inconsistent. 
Had a similar principle been applied to European countries or Taiwan straight after World 
War II, they would never have received substantial assistance. This is undoubtedly happening 
today: while it seems at least as effective or even more effective to promote growth in 
post-conflict states than elsewhere (Addison & McGillivray, 2004), most donors appear 
to underprovide aid to fragile states. The levels of such aid are also much more volatile, 
adding poor aid predictability to an already uncertain situation (Levin & Dollar, 2005; 
McGillivray & Feeny, 2008; OECD, 2008).
Finally, poor performers frequently face structural disadvantages over which the state 
has little or no control. These include being a landlocked country, having/not having 
natural resources, unfavourable climatic conditions, high/low population density, and 
the like (Cogneau & Naudet, 2007). These disadvantages are not reflected in the CPIA. 
Neither does the CPIA take into account fragilities emanating from a country’s external 
vulnerability, such as any harmful policies of developed countries or the actions of large 
private companies (Carment et al., 2008).
These criticisms of the holistic dimensions of the CPIA approach support the growing 
literature showing that every case is specific and there is no one-size-fits-all solution. 
The trend should not be towards seeking a (probably flawed) standardised answer but 
rather towards engaging in aggressively innovative, situation-specific, trial-and-error 
processes to foster social and economic development.
3.2 Current post-conflict intervention: The OECD DAC Principles
A comparison between the Marshall Plan and the JCRR, the IDA methodology and the 
OECD DAC Principles helps to identify possible weaknesses in contemporary approaches. 
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Table 2 summarises the main features of the two post-war reconstruction programmes 
reviewed above, the ten OECD DAC Principles and the main characteristics of today’s 
fragile states. It highlights the context of external interventions, important characteristics 
of the recipients, the kind of assistance that is provided and the instruments used. 
In the first two columns, the coloured cells emphasise the differences between the Marshall 
Plan and the JCRR. As noted above, these differences are due mainly to Taiwan being a 
developing country at the time; its weak capacity was offset by more planning and the 
implementation of the “felt needs” approach. 
The third column outlines the OECD DAC Principles, and the coloured cells highlight the 
differences between them and the previous successes; these are explained in the rest of 
this section. The last column deals with the current interventions in agriculture and will 
be expanded on in the next section.
This table is not exhaustive; however, it provides a broad analytical framework for comparing 
principles of post-conflict intervention. The purpose is less to be exhaustive than to point out 
some features of the OECD DAC Principles. Note, however, that these Principles only guide 
and do not bind donors, since there is no mechanism of enforcement.
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Table 2: Features of post-war interventions, contemporary fragile states and the 
OECD DAC Principles
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3.2.1 Is state building misleading?
The first priority in the OECD DAC Principles is “strengthening the state”. The features of 
today’s African governments, especially those in post-conflict or fragile states, are very 
different from those of the European governments after 1945. This may seem to imply that 
supporting state formation in fragile countries is the necessary condition for obtaining the 
same level of aid effectiveness or the same leveraging effect on development. 
What is the rationale behind making state building the central objective of donor 
interventions? There are, obviously, many good reasons to support state formation but 
why is it seen as an absolute priority in the early stage of the recovery process when states 
are so weak and the difficulties of building them so immense? Is there not a risk in diverting 
scarce resources from social and economic development to the complex project of state 
building? A few authors pinpoint the necessity of rethinking the state-building approach. 
Some, like Ellis (2005: 137), even put forward some form of international trusteeship, 
“anathema since colonialism”, which probably deserves more attention. (The JCRR sheds 
some light on what a trusteeship could mean today.)
Still, the state-building objective may be acceptable for a single reason: it stands in a 
sharp contrast to the development paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, when donor 
policy recommendations (and conditionalities) were based on a minimalist view of the 
state. Their structural adjustment programmes aimed at reducing the role of the state and 
imposing macroeconomic reforms along the line of the Washington Consensus. 
With hindsight, this paradigm has failed. The post-Washington Consensus recognises the 
state as a vital actor that needs to be strengthened; it also acknowledges that there is no 
one-size-fits-all recipe for an effective state (World Bank, 1997). The Commission on Growth 
and Development (2008) represents, for many, a watershed in thinking on international 
development (see, for instance, Kanbur, 2008; Rodrik, 2008). It proposes a wide range 
of policies that the state should develop and implement to promote development. 
But, in practice, because of their inherent weaknesses (Bayart, 2006; Van de Walle, 2001), 
post-conflict and fragile states are unlikely to exercise this vital prerogative that the 
international community wishes to allocate to them, at least in the short run.
One practical consequence of the inability of fragile states to “make foreign assistance 
more effective” is the introduction of aid instruments beyond those of the Marshall Plan: 
humanitarian aid and budgetary support. They are designed to overcome the weaknesses 
of a fragile state but instead tend to overtake the state in fulfilling its prerogatives. This leads 
to the following paradox: to increase aid effectiveness, some favour project support that is 
delivered outside of the (weak) state institutions (Addison & McGillivray, 2004) but this could 
work against strengthening these institutions. Using channels such as non-governmental 
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organisations, the private sector and independent service authorities can help to make aid 
more effective (McGillivray, 2006) but also undermines the state’s credibility and legitimacy. 
To prevent this, one of the OECD DAC Principles emphasises the need for aligning donor 
interventions with local priorities, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005). This seems to be a lesser option, followed instead of acknowledging that state 
building, while crucial, may not be the primary priority.
3.2.2 Neglected principles
As highlighted in the third column of Table 2, four dimensions of the post-war reconstruction 
process are beyond the scope of OECD DAC Principles. These dimensions were crucial to 
the two success stories: the integrated approach to development, including industrial 
policies; the “jointness” principle; the importance of safety nets or subsidies to cushion the 
impact of the structural transformation; and a regional approach.14
First, the main concern is to ensure that any post-conflict initiative contributes to the 
country’s overarching development strategy. This is particularly important because crises 
are more likely to occur in low-income countries, bringing stagnation or even decline 
(Collier, 2007), and because sudden changes in economic conditions seem to spark off such 
crises (Miguel et al., 2004; Djankov & Reynal-Querol, 2010). While these conclusions are 
drawn from a purely economic analysis of fragility, they may be necessary conditions for 
recovery. Yet, the OECD DAC Principles do not address this issue, except in terms of the 
need for improved governance and the definition of “good” macroeconomic policies. 
Many fragile states are in a long-awaited structural transformation, which should be 
synonymous with economic growth and poverty alleviation. Lessons from past structural 
transformations, notably in Asia after the 1960s, show that industrial policies were crucial 
to these transformations, bringing in the private sector to invest in strategic sectors 
(Liang & Hou Liang, 1988; Lawrence, 2005; Shapiro, 2007; Amsden, 2008). The competition 
for private investment is so harsh that, without measures that extend beyond the principles 
of good governance, the likelihood of private investment in fragile states is very low. 
When a state is too weak to develop and implement industrial policies, innovative alternative 
mechanisms must be used to offset this weakness at least in the short run.
Second, the way foreign aid is managed has to be rethought: budget support is the ideal 
type of aid when the aim is to strengthen the state but it becomes an uncertain option in 
difficult situations. In these situations, donors seeking to prevent the misuse of aid funds 
may choose to support non-state institutions instead, which could easily contradict the 
state-building objective. The “jointness” principle of both the JCRR and, more informally, 
14  This does not mean that these factors are not mentioned in the literature about the role of the state; see, for instance,  
World Bank (1997) and the Commission on Growth and Development (2008).
Agriculture and economic recovery in post-conflict countries: Lessons we never learnt 
Page 26
Development Planning Division 
Working Paper Series No. 22
the Marshall Plan could mitigate this risk, since it brings together (top-down) government 
priorities and (bottom-up) people’s needs. Co-responsibility was the core principle of the 
JCRR, evident at both the policy level (two governments) and the implementation level 
(using a sponsoring institution). The OECD DAC (2010: 72) recently highlighted this principle 
as a potential driver of future intervention through its introduction of “dual-control oversight 
mechanisms” to jointly manage donor and state funds.
Third, social safety nets played an important part in the recovery of the European countries 
after World War II and in the structural transformation of the Asian economies. However, 
it is absent from the OECD DAC Principles. Safety nets took several forms, ranging from 
pure social safety nets to subsidies for vital activities and even price controls.15 They were 
often provided with foreign aid support. Of course, humanitarian aid can partially fulfil 
this role in the short term but safety nets are generally necessary in the medium to long 
run. For aid to play this role, it must accompany the development process until the state 
becomes capable of taking over the provision of safety nets. Also, aid mechanisms have to 
be consistent with the recovery dynamic and not impede it.
Finally, a country-based approach is probably insufficient. Cliffe and Alfandari (2007) stress 
the regional dimension of conflicts because of the support that rebel groups could obtain 
from vested interests in neighbouring countries. Conflict and fragility also have ripple 
effects on neighbouring countries, mainly through displaced people crossing borders to 
escape war or poverty. This could lead to further conflict, especially when the neighbouring 
state is also weak. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the OECD DAC Principles to highlight 
this dimension. Donors tend to underprovide aid not only to post-conflict and fragile 
states, as noted, but also to countries that are near areas in conflict (Bella & Yannitell 
Reinhardt, 2008).
Some of these elements are not specific to post-conflict and fragile states, and are addressed 
in other international initiatives around foreign assistance, as discussed in the next section.
3.3 Other initiatives on foreign aid
As noted, there are two main initiatives on foreign aid (see Table 1). The first one stems 
from the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation (2003), namely, the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), which deal with the 
effectiveness of aid. This first initiative is especially important for at least two reasons:
•	 	Contrary to the OECD DAC Principles, it includes monitoring and evaluation of the progress 
towards achieving the objectives of its agreements.
15  In Taiwan, the government imposed low prices for staples to support urban and non-agricultural households in rural areas. 
However, it also provided agricultural support such as input subsidies, extension services and education to enable farmers  
to increase their income.
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•	 	It brings on board some of the emergent donors who are neither OECD DAC nor OECD 
members – and thus not bound by the OECD DAC Principles – but who commit to 
coordinating their foreign assistance. Such donors include China, Korea, Kuwait, Thailand 
and South Africa.
The Paris Declaration broadly acknowledges partners’ ownership of the development strategy, 
the alignment of donor priorities with this country-owned strategy, the harmonisation of 
donor practices, and the accountability of both donors and partners for tangible results. 
However, the Declaration is limited on post-conflict and fragile states: only a paragraph 
is dedicated to them in the section on harmonisation, relating to the first version of the 
OECD DAC Principles.
More interesting is the process that was followed and its outcomes. The Paris Declaration 
included an enforcement mechanism: targets were identified for 2010, as were 12 indicators 
to monitor them. The first evaluation of the Paris Declaration concluded that the pace 
of progress was much slower than expected and that further action was necessary 
(Wood et al., 2008). Consequently, the last conference on aid effectiveness endorsed 
the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008. 
While the Accra Agenda tries to find solutions to the implementation challenges of 
the Paris Declaration, it also addresses the specific challenges raised by fragile countries. 
The emphasis is on the following aspects:
•	 	Conduct joint assessments of governance and capacity needs, and the causes of  
fragility. In contrast, the OECD DAC Principles simply state that donors should  
“take context as a starting point”. Understanding the root cause of fragility is  
a prerequisite for the success for any external intervention.
•	 	Prioritise the objectives that were identified as prerequisites for development.
•	 	Jointly design and sequence interim measures that lead to sustainable institutions,  
on a demand-driven basis. This implicitly recognises the government’s limited  
ability to act and the necessity of establishing priorities.
•	 	Improve the coordination, flexibility and predictability of aid.
•	 	Monitor the implementation of the OECD DAC Principles.
A second evaluation of the Paris Declaration was launched in November 2009 and its results 
will be presented at the 4th High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness planned for late 2011 
in Seoul.
The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda represent an important step beyond the 
OECD DAC Principles in that they address vital elements and include a monitoring process. 
However, they do not directly address the five dimensions identified above as potentially 
crucial for supporting post-conflict and fragile countries.
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The second important initiative is the United Nations programme on Financing for 
Development. This initiative was launched in 2002 when, after several years of declining 
foreign aid, it became clear that aid resources would be insufficient for meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals. The first milestone in this programme was the 
endorsement of the Monterrey Consensus (United Nations, 2002). Somewhat surprisingly, 
it did not mention post-conflict or fragile states despite the timing – only a year after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. On this issue, the Consensus was not ready 
(Daviron & Giordano, 2007).
While the 2008 review of the Monterrey Consensus recognises the importance of financing 
for post-conflict countries and welcomes the Accra Agenda, no further commitments are 
recorded and fragile states are not mentioned (United Nations, 2008). And yet, the lack of 
additional resources for post-conflict and fragile states has been underlined (McGillivray, 
2006; McGillivray & Feeny, 2008). Is this because the Consensus requires countries to raise 
national resources for their own development? Post-conflict countries can certainly do that, 
but not in the short run.
4. Principles for post-conflict interventions in agriculture
The previous section highlighted four dimensions that, while absent from the OECD DAC 
Principles, were central to economic and agricultural recovery after World War II. This section 
reviews the literature on recent external agricultural interventions in post-conflict situations, 
mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, to assess the extent to which these dimensions have been 
incorporated. It also compares current interventions with the two success stories of the 
past to review donor strategies in this light.
4.1 Understanding the roots and context of fragility
The upstream challenge of donor interventions, whatever their nature, is to understand 
the root causes of fragility in the social, cultural, economic, institutional and political 
context. Unfortunately, a lack of information and knowledge is a standard feature of 
post-conflict states, especially when they emerge from a protracted crisis. The first aspect 
on which information is needed deals with the political processes underpinning the 
fragility. A thorough analysis must be conducted to understand the contending interests, 
people or communities among which donors seek to intervene. One aspect of information 
relates to the long-term evolution of the country. Here too, very little first-hand information is 
available: national statistical systems have often been dismantled and whatever case studies 
may be available are often too localised to allow any generalisation. Yet, understanding the 
changes that took place during the conflict is crucial for planning meso- and micro-level 
interventions.
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4.1.1 Supporting the assessment of needs
External interventions cannot be formulated without understanding how economic sectors 
evolved, how informal institutions adapted, which actors (e.g. elites, commanders and 
warlords) emerged and what power they now wield (e.g. controlled access to resources 
such as land). In addition, Flores et al. (2005) emphasise the need to understand the nature, 
scale and history of the crisis, and Longley et al. (2006) focuses on the political economy 
of the conflict. These form a major part of the analytical framework in which external 
interventions should be developed and, later, monitored and assessed. Alinovi et al. (2007: 19) 
point out that “the interaction of institutional breakdown and conflict has provoked the 
development of new, non-state centres of authority that consolidate themselves around 
alternative patterns of social control, protection and profit. Understanding such interactions 
requires a certain level of politico-economic analysis, which has sometimes been undertaken, 
but tends to remain confined mostly to academic circles, with little impact on the policy 
process.” These changes, and the reasons for them, must be taken into account in assessing 
both the possible interventions and the process to be followed.
To overcome the information problems, the United Nations Development Group and the 
World Bank developed Post-conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and a Transitional Results 
Framework (TRF) to identify priorities for intervention.16 The PCNA was first set up in 2003 
and then reviewed in 2006. It underscores the importance of a full assessment of needs, 
conducted jointly by national and international experts, to enable the formulation of an 
implementation plan. This process comprises four steps:
•	 	Pre-assessment: It aims at identifying the causes and characteristics of the conflict,  
as well as the priorities for keeping the peace process on track.
•	 	Full assessment and recovery planning: Its purpose is to evaluate needs and prioritise  
the programmes, with objectives and budgets, that will comprise the TRF.
•	 	Validating and financing: This stage has two objectives. The first is to ensure that 
donors and national actors share ownership and accountability; the second is to  
ensure that the objectives are matched by funding commitments.
•	 	Implementation and monitoring: This phase includes the possibility of revising and 
adapting the TRF, while ensuring that the different partners endorse the modifications.
The main reservation about the PCNA/TRF is the identification of needs and, therefore, 
priorities on a consensual basis between the different partners. While the objective is clearly 
to guarantee ownership and accountability, which is a necessary condition for success, 
it suffers from the same bias as the CPIA in terms of the rationale:
16  The information on the PCNA and the TRF are mainly drawn from the UNDG-World Bank (2007).
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•	 	It assumes that the prerequisites for economic development are clear and, consequently, 
that identifying the needs corresponds to identifying the gaps.
•	 	The view of the donor may prevail in terms of both diagnosing the problem and setting 
the objectives of the recovery process, simply because donors only commit to (and are 
accountable for) objectives they believe in.
Part of the answer lies in the quality of the pre-assessment phase, where the understanding 
of the situation is shaped. It is crucial to avoid mistakes in this phase. However, this is 
also the shortest and quickest phase, for two reasons: it occurs early in the peace process, 
when emergency actions are needed to sustain the peace, and is preliminary to the rest of 
the PCNA/TRF. To mitigate with the risk of misunderstanding the causes of the conflict and 
the underlying stakes, an ongoing political, social and economic analysis of the situation 
(not only the needs) would be of great value. Still, this may not be sufficient for donors to 
accept the views of national actors on the reconstruction process; other mechanisms may 
have to be developed as well. 
4.1.2 The “felt needs” approach
Understanding the root causes of the crisis before taking any action is a crucial determinant 
of success. For example, during the crisis, farmers may have shifted their priorities from 
income-generating activities to food security. Flores et al. (2005: S38) stress that “the 
highly differentiated, fluid and indefinite nature of ‘protracted crises’ tends to preclude 
any possibility of predetermining which kinds of food security interventions are appropriate 
and which are not. Also required is a more wide-ranging and politically informed analysis 
of options than is usually attempted.”
Longley et al. (2006: 15) state that “conflict has a much more multifaceted impact on 
production than might be assumed”. They identify two sets of challenges in evaluating 
the impact of conflict on the agricultural activities of households: first, understanding 
the short- and long-term shifts in activities and strategies, and the dynamism and resilience 
of farmers and, second, understanding market shifts, including risks and opportunities. 
Several elements should be assessed when designing interventions (Flores et al., 2005):
•	 	How does the dynamic nature of the crisis affect agriculture and food security?
•	 	What is the socio-political context and how does it affect households?
•	 	What institutional arrangements created by the crisis could affect project implementation?
•	 	What are the interactions between long-term and short-term food security?
Alinovi et al. (2007) underscore the critical role of institutional transformation in promoting 
food security. They highlight factors such as the traditional regulatory mechanisms, especially 
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those related to land tenure; social norms; safety nets; the regulation of natural resources; 
and markets. “International responses to the crises have focused mainly on life-saving and 
short-term livelihoods protection measures. They have scarcely recognised the importance 
of institutional issues and have failed to support those institutional processes that could 
have mitigated the effects of the crises… [Now, however,] interventions are increasingly 
judged on how they are inserted into national and local contexts and whether or not 
they contribute to the building or rebuilding of national trust, capacities and institutions” 
(Flores et al., 2005: S26).
A better understanding of the local context would certainly lead to the development of 
new approaches. Longley et al. (2006: 7) explain that “the problem with all ‘re’ words 
(rehabilitation, reconstruction, rebuilding, recovery, revitalization, among others) is the 
implicit assumption of a return to a former, supposedly stable and desirable state of affairs. 
Such an assumption is particularly inappropriate in a post-conflict context, since a return 
to the pre-conflict situation may merely recreate the conditions that led to war in the first 
place.” Furthermore, during the conflict, the agricultural production pattern necessarily 
evolved, especially because both the local context (e.g. new actors) and the global 
context (e.g. international prices) changed. New opportunities may also have developed. 
Vlassenroot et al. (2005: 24-25) note: “The case of eastern DRC [Democratic Republic of 
Congo] reveals that protracted crises can cause considerable shifts in local food systems… 
These new conditions have forced most households to invest in alternative strategies of 
survival. This explains why in several regions agricultural production has lost its importance 
to the advantage of mining or fishing activities; it also explains why some food-producing 
regions have become food importing areas during the war. These shifts in local food 
systems have attracted little attention from humanitarian agencies.”
To overcome these difficulties, the “felt needs” approach developed by the JCRR offers 
the possibility of both understanding these changes by allowing local actors to set their 
own priorities, and supporting emerging institutional dynamics. Furthermore, it helps to 
overcome any lack of leadership the government may display without undermining its 
legitimacy.
4.2 State building, but not only
Because of the transformation of institutions and the evolution of the balance of power, 
it becomes challenging to define how state building can be supported. The sizeable literature on 
this issue is not reviewed here; only a few important elements are highlighted below.
4.2.1 Why question the state-building objective?
State building has been the motto of the post-Cold War period. During the Cold War, 
the two main blocs provided aid to developing countries to expand their own influence. 
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These countries often played the two blocs off against each other to obtain more aid, not 
necessarily for their own people. After the Cold War, when the economic situation became 
untenable, many of these countries lost their bargaining power. They had to abide by 
the conditionalities set by the international financial institutions and other donors for a 
minimal state. While this did bring some level of stability, it was often at the expense of the 
political status quo and/or the economy. Only in the 1990s did the international community 
acknowledge the importance of an effective state (World Bank, 1993 &1997). 
The pendulum seems to have swung back somewhat: in view of the paucity of local skills, 
donors want to avoid the public sector growing more rapidly than the economy, as it did in 
many African countries in the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, the OECD DAC Principles hold 
state building as a central objective. What does this objective mean in the context of state 
formation and the functions in Africa’s fragile states? And should it be the main objective? 
The answer would be yes if, based on the lessons learnt from the Marshall Plan, the purpose 
would be to recreate the conditions for its success. The answer would be more qualified 
if, based on the historical trajectory of African countries and their own experience of the state, 
the purpose would be to replicate the prerequisites for the success of the Marshall Plan, 
or quite simply to trigger sustained economic growth.
Until now, the answer has been unambiguous: overcoming the weaknesses of the state is 
the priority, as the World Bank CPIA illustrates. The main issue has been to identify the 
minimum features of such a state (Ghani et al., 2005; OECD DAC, 2007; Commission 
on Growth and Development, 2008). State-building approaches have mostly been based 
on imposing the structure and functions of the modern Western state on Africa rather than 
establishing the conditions for building “modern” African states. 
One of the primary contradictions in current state-building approaches is that donors tend 
to impose economic and political reforms without due consideration for local realities, 
including resistance to change (Engelbert & Tull, 2008). An attempt to impose the structure 
of a modern Western state on a fragile state may well, in itself, be a source of fragility: 
the speed, scope and nature of the changes may be so significant that society as a whole 
may have neither the time nor the ability to adapt to them. Hence, instead of focusing 
on enhancing the state’s capacity to rule, often at the expense of local power, networks 
and institutions, state-building approaches should integrate local realities and enforce the 
state’s ability to rule from a distance, through these existing power configurations, networks 
and institutions. These are, in fact, important characteristics of modern government 
(Rose & Miller, 1992). As Pouligny (2009: 3) states, “the challenge for outsiders is to capture 
the multiplicity and diversity of political institutions, cultures and logics – in other words of 
‘modalities of governance’ – through which state resilience and state building processes 
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may be supported”. This means that another approach to state building must be developed, 
not for the sake of state building but rather for stability and recovery. This would be consistent 
with the operating principles of the JCRR, where local institutions were carefully selected for 
project identification, implementation and financing.
The approach to state building needs to be flexible enough to allow a unique state to 
emerge in each country, taking into account the domestic contingencies. It should pay heed 
to the political context of reconstruction, its historical trajectory, the social dimensions of 
development, the complex interactions between individuals and society, the international 
and regional contexts that affect the country, and the role of the elites. All these factors 
influence the demand for state coordination and regulation; all shape the kind of state 
that should emerge. Such an approach contrasts with the current practices and argues not 
only for overcoming the knowledge gap but also for new ways of designing and managing 
external interventions. This process of state building could well take several years, implying 
that some important responsibilities of the state might fall upon the international community 
in the meantime. During this period, attention should be focused on the process of social 
and economic development.
4.2.2 Support private sector interventions
Longley et al. (2006: 4) note that a “crisis involves the inability of a state to fulfil its core 
functions to the extent that the contract between a state and its citizens completely breaks 
down. (Re)establishing this contract between a state and citizens in a country emerging 
from conflict is a key feature of post-conflict recovery. In the agricultural sector, it is achieved 
through the establishment of both public support and a dynamic but regulated private 
sector that provides appropriate and high-quality agricultural inputs and services.” Gerson 
(2001: 107) also emphasises this dimension, expanding it beyond agriculture: “Stabilization 
itself depends on private sector entry; hence, waiting for stabilization as a precondition for 
entry becomes a self-defeating strategy”.17
Supports for private initiatives are likely to rely heavily on market mechanisms but weak states 
may not have the ability to address any market failures. Consequently, market imperfections 
should be investigated carefully. Measures to reduce them (e.g. lowering transaction costs, 
strengthening infrastructure, improving market access or providing security) should be 
considered as complementary to the success of the initiative. However, conflicts could lead 
markets to collapse. Therefore, it is important to assess the real impact of any (regional) 
conflict on the project and how the project relates to the rest of the country or region.
17  Ruiters and Giordano (2010) analyse the role of development finance institutions in supporting private sector development; 
these institutions complement the activities of donors who may not regard private sector support as a priority in post-conflict 
situations.
Agriculture and economic recovery in post-conflict countries: Lessons we never learnt 
Page 34
Development Planning Division 
Working Paper Series No. 22
The main issue is to mobilise domestic and foreign savings for productive investments. 
In Europe after World War II, foreign investments were at their lowest level after the 
war. American investors saw Europe as unattractive, offering neither security nor profitability. 
To counter such concerns, it is important to ensure that private investors can rapidly seize 
post-crisis opportunities that are real and long lasting. Brück et al. (2000) contrasted the 
post-war dynamics of Mozambique and Nicaragua, especially the recovery of the agricultural 
sector. In Mozambique, support for small farmers ensured that food production recovered 
more rapidly than export production, which probably favoured poverty reduction and job 
creation. In Nicaragua, the opposite occurred: an improvement of external solvency but 
a low level of poverty reduction. They emphasise “[f]irst, that post-war reconstruction 
based on small farmers can be more rapid as they are able to respond rapidly to access 
to land and labour, and in any case do not have alternative asset choices. Second, that a 
recovery programme based on small rather than large business is likely to have more positive 
redistributive effects and thus reduce poverty more rapidly” (Brück et al., 2000: 36). 
Following these conclusions, small and medium-scale farmers should receive particular 
support. Well-defined import tariffs could also facilitate the recovery of food production. 
This process could be significantly more complicated than expected: the labour force 
on small farms may not necessarily have the capability to farm and may need training 
in this regard; land may not be available and a land reform process may be required. 
Such situations can cause considerable delays in the recovery of the agricultural sector. 
At the same time, even though the leverage effect on poverty may be relatively low, 
supporting commercial farming is necessary, especially if exports are needed to generate 
foreign exchange. Agricultural export value chains often recover sooner when the 
government or the international community develops policies to enable trade. These could 
include special export zones or other forms of export promotion by the government, and 
guarantee schemes and soft loans from the international community.
Supporting private actors upstream (through seeds, inputs and credit provision) and/or 
downstream (through transformation, commercialisation and economic infrastructure) 
could improve the productivity levels of small and medium-scale farmers. Yet, this will 
depend largely on the state of markets. Where rural markets are severely affected, a shift 
from tradable to non-tradable sectors may have occurred, and private actors, operating 
either upstream or downstream, will rely on the pace of market recovery.
4.3 Agriculture as the mainstay of the structural transformation
The previous conclusion argues in favour of a more balanced approach to state building, with 
a greater focus on economic development. Many post-conflict and fragile countries remain 
at the early stages of development. They have not yet undergone a structural transformation 
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and their people, and the economy, rely mainly on agriculture. This means that agriculture 
has to be handled with particular caution. Two fundamental issues have to be addressed: 
at the micro level, the role of agriculture in sustaining rural livelihoods and, at the macro 
level, the role of agriculture in the overarching development strategy. Linking these two 
dimensions was the mainstay of Taiwan’s recovery.
At the micro level, in rural areas, sustaining livelihoods entails a wider range of economic 
activities than solely agriculture. Agriculture is neither automatically the mainstay of 
household food security nor necessarily the primary livelihood activity. Farming is but one 
activity among many and constitutes only a portion of the income of rural households. 
Households diversify income sources mainly to satisfy their daily needs (Bryceson, 2002). 
Supporting food production in rural areas may guarantee food availability without 
ensuring that households have access to it. Still, while agriculture is unlikely to be the 
main driver of rural development, it will play an important role. The fierce competition 
for agricultural production, the new norms and standards acting as barriers to trade, and 
the unfair agricultural policies of the OECD countries are all reasons why an upsurge of 
agriculture at the micro level is highly improbable. Yet, agriculture provides a social safety 
net in rural and peri-urban areas, which may be particularly important at the outset of 
the recovery process.
At the macro level, the situation may be rather different: a slight improvement at the farm 
level may have huge macroeconomic benefits owing to the high proportion of households 
involved in agriculture. Boosting agricultural activities can have multiple purposes, ranging 
from strengthening food availability – bearing in mind that domestic production often relies 
on smallholders – to generating income or tax revenue. But its ultimate contribution is to 
the process of economic development: in these countries, the economic transition is still 
to occur. This transition was responsible for the surge of growth and development in 
developed countries at the outset of the 20th century, in Japan after World War II and 
among the “Asian tigers” in the 1980s. There have been dramatic changes of the 
international environment, such as trade liberalisation, state withdrawal, the restructuring 
of international and regional markets, a multiplicity of public and private norms, increasing 
flows of knowledge and information, growing numbers of actors and scales of governance, 
and technological progress. Still, recent studies show that this development pattern should 
still hold.18 Therefore, how should the role of agriculture in the domestic development 
strategy be defined in the medium to long run? What should the priorities be to ensure 
that agriculture plays this role? These questions are addressed in the next section.
18  On the necessity of strengthening the agricultural sector to sustain economic growth, see, among others, Lipton (2005);  
Tiffin & Irz (2006); Diao et al. (2007); Staatz and Dembele (2007); World Bank (2007); Summer et al. (2008); Timmer & Akkus 
(2008); Losch et al. (2009) and Ravallion (2009). The crucial role of agriculture was already on the agenda in the 1980s,  
as the 1982 World Development Report emphasised (World Bank, 1982).
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4.4 Planning and sequencing
A successful peace or the overcoming of fragility relies on the economic success of the 
recovery process, which must be shared by the majority of the people. To this end, getting 
the fundamentals right is not a sufficient solution. With the post-Washington Consensus, 
the international community has acknowledged the role of the state not only as an enabler 
of well-functioning markets but also as a driver of the economy. For most of the African 
countries that have not gone through the economic transition, the role of the state in this 
regard focuses on restructuring and diversifying their economies.
4.4.1 Efficient use of scarce resources
Because developing countries have limited resources, whether capital, human or institutional, 
they cannot address all the challenges they face. They need to plan their actions and 
prioritise and sequence their policies. Because post-conflict and fragile countries have even 
less capacity, the international community needs to support this process of structural 
transformation. It should be a priority of donors to ensure that the state becomes 
progressively more capable of regaining its influence. In other words, aid should be finite, 
its time horizon limited and the handing over to the government carefully planned.
Hausmann et al. (2005) developed a growth diagnostic framework aiming at identifying 
the most binding constraints on economic growth. While not specifically designed for 
post-conflict and fragile states, the framework can easily be applied to them. It is based 
on the following considerations:
•	 	Economic growth is the central challenge faced by developing countries; to promote 
development, a growth strategy is required.
•	 	There is no one-size-fits-all growth strategy and local contingencies have to be taken 
into account.
•	 	Governments face limitations and consequently cannot address every hurdle at the  
same time.
The methodology has attracted some criticism and has been revised (see Hausmann 
et al., 2008). Still, the framework can be seen as a breakthrough in the development field; 
it stands in stark contrast to the universal ambition of the Washington Consensus, without 
completely departing from “getting the fundamentals right”. Its main advantage is flexibility 
in identifying the priority reforms. The framework has been applied both by the World 
Bank19 and the Asian Development Bank20 with a measure of success. Ali (2009) suggests 
applying it to post-conflict countries. 
19  go.worldbank.org/HXX29AT3X0
20  www.adb.org/Projects/Country-Diagnostic-Studies/growth-diagnostic.asp 
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In the framework, an important aspect for post-conflict and fragile states is the emphasis 
on private investment, especially in the short run. Rodrik (2009: 44) call for “an investment 
strategy to kick-start growth”. Rather than state building being the first priority, investment 
is seen as the main driver of increased productivity. The next objective is to identify the 
most binding constraints that prevent gains in productivity. This is crucial in fragile and 
post-conflict countries for at least two reasons:
•	 	The state has a limited capacity to invest but not necessarily to act, and there is an 
opportunity for donors to promote private investment while supporting state building.
•	 	The level of private investment is so low that even a slight increase can make a big 
difference. Donors can easily favour mechanisms to boost private investment.21
While this framework provides a clear diagnostic of what is not working, no solutions can 
be designed without going back to the previous step – understanding the reasons for these 
binding constraints to growth. It then becomes possible to suggest policies that are well 
suited to the context and contingencies of the country in question.
4.4.2 Consistency of short- and long-term interventions
Longley et al. (2006) use Sierra Leone and Afghanistan as case studies. They point out that 
the first intervention by international agencies is often the distribution of seeds to farmers. 
Yet, there is no clear evidence that seed programmes are the most appropriate intervention. 
The distribution of seeds and tools was one of the main interventions in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, where it aimed to support agricultural production among the most 
vulnerable groups. While acknowledging that the efficiency of seed distribution has not 
been evaluated in this case, Vlassenroot et al. (2005) question whether this approach is 
sufficient. Seed distribution may be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one; extension 
services, financial services or enforced title deeds also affect agricultural production. Longley 
et al. (2006) suggest that agencies should first provide extension services and microcredit. 
The main issue beyond the provision of services is whether farmers can access the right 
mix of services. Therefore, they put forward that any “piecemeal, project-based approaches 
need to be linked, not only to a greater understanding of what farmers actually do, 
but also to an overall strategy for delivery of inputs and services” (Longley et al., 2006: 25). 
The most binding constrains to agricultural development can only be identified when 
the local context is clearly understood. Analysis of the local context deserves much more 
attention, as Longley et al. (2006: 17) illustrate: “Despite the collapse of government or 
project-based agricultural inputs and services, farmers are often able to continue to access 
such inputs and services through local social networks (including patron–client relationships) 
21  See, for instance, Ruiters and Giordano (2010).
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and – to some extent – private sector providers. However, the quality of the inputs and services 
available is often very low, and costs can be prohibitive. The challenge for post-conflict 
external assistance, therefore, is to improve the provision and reliability of inputs and 
services without undermining these local informal social protection mechanisms or 
hindering the role of private sector providers.”
Furthermore, Longley et al. (2006: 25) emphasise that promoting markets is vital to 
support rural livelihoods in a post-conflict situation: “The major role of the private sector 
in the provision of inputs and services is increasingly recognised, but challenges surround 
enabling the emergence of service providers, stimulating demand and improving the quality 
of inputs and accountability of services provided.” At the same time, there is a need to 
complement such upstream market development with downstream market development, 
that is, to provide households with the basic transport and information infrastructure. 
“Efforts to promote the development of market systems and infrastructure tend to be 
localised, fragmented and poorly coordinated, and often focus on either input or output 
markets, with little integration between the two” (Longley et al., 2006: 26). Finally, market 
development needs to emerge from a good understanding of potential market opportunities. 
Vlassenroot et al. (2005) also put forward market and land access as two major issues 
that have barely been addressed in the Democratic Republic of Congo despite being 
major constraints to food security and major explanations for food insecurity.
It is clear from these reviews of post-conflict interventions in agriculture that a holistic 
approach is required to “relaunch” agriculture. This would need to include the distribution 
of seeds and tools, the provision of infrastructure and market-oriented reforms, for example. 
As Kunz (1997) noticed, the Marshall Plan clearly articulated a relief and recovery programme. 
Its long-term vision for Western Europe was built on a multi-year programme; this strongly 
enforced the perception of long-term stability, which is required for economic actors to 
invest (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2005). In post-conflict states, the same approach is required. 
Even when different agencies undertake relief and recovery actions, a clear and coherent 
articulation of the two types of intervention is required to enhance synergies and increase 
efficiencies. Veron (2007) emphasises that reconstruction and development support depends 
partly on the way aid relief has been managed.
Interventions around agriculture and food security generally suffer from inappropriate 
thinking on the compatibility of interventions and inadequate linkages between the 
(short) timeframe of the interventions and the long-term needs of the country (Alinovi et al., 
2007; Alinovi and Russo, 2009).
This issue is particularly important since achieving food security and agricultural development 
could even be mutually exclusive. Alinovi et al. (2007: 14) emphasise that “there is a 
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marked tendency to focus on food availability (food aid and immediate agricultural recovery 
measures) rather than on the access and stability dimensions of food security”. A better 
identification and clarification of the true objectives and their role in the overarching 
development strategy should avoid these drawbacks. What role is attributed to agriculture 
in the country’s development process? According to what timeframe? How is domestic 
agriculture linked to national food security in terms of self-sufficiency and the availability 
and accessibility of food? How can short-term objectives for food security be reconciled 
with long-term increases in agricultural productivity? 
5. Conclusion
Agriculture remains the most important economic sector in most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Fostering agricultural development is a crucial challenge for most countries; it is an 
even greater challenge for post-conflict countries where agriculture may be the refuge activity 
for most of the population. This paper extends the principles upon which donors plan their 
post-conflict support for agriculture, using lessons drawn from the only successes in this 
field after World War II. It shows that the general principles endorsed by the international 
community lack several elements that made the recovery of Europe and Taiwan so successful 
in the 1950s. These include properly understanding the root causes of the conflict and its 
context; moving beyond state building as the main objective; promoting the structural 
transformation of the economy; and supporting agriculture as part of an integrated 
development strategy. 
In other words, the state needs to design its development strategy, identify how agriculture 
might contribute to it, and set up the principles of its agricultural policy. In all probability, 
the sooner stakeholders agree to strategies and priorities, the faster will be the recovery 
from conflict and the more rapid the rebuilding of the state. The objective is to avoid 
the creation of a collection of projects without a coherent long-term vision for rural and 
agricultural development, to avoid fragmented and piecemeal projects, and to promote 
coordinated and synergetic actions. A fragile government may not immediately play a 
strong role in providing inputs (e.g. seeds and fertiliser) and services (e.g. credit, technical 
assistance and phytosanitary and veterinary services) to the agricultural sector because 
it lacks the financial means and institutional capacity in the short run. But this may not 
detract from its ability to set out its vision so that other actors can align themselves to the 
long-term priorities of the country.
At the same time, needs are important: local communities, non-governmental organisations 
and the private sector should develop relevant projects while they wait for the re-establishment 
of the state’s authority and its capacity to act. Consequently, in the early stages, the recovery 
process would rely mainly on local and private initiatives. The “jointness” principle offers 
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many advantages in this respect since it allows for donor coordination as well as broader 
coordination between donors, the government, local authorities and local actors through 
a sound buy-in process. The buy-in process may be strengthened through the financial 
contribution of the local institutions that implement the projects, and thereby compensate 
for the lack of capacity of the government. Finally, to retain the overall consistency of 
the development vision, a careful selection of projects is needed. One important criterion 
would be for the project to respond to the “felt needs” of the people; another would be for 
it to benefit the greater number of people, especially the poor.
These are basic principles that need to be customised to every specific situation. However, 
they do not really emerge from the current literature on agricultural reconstruction in 
post-conflict situations. Donors may improve their interventions by including these principles 
to enhance aid effectiveness and decrease the vulnerability of many fragile states.
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